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ci.2013.0Abstract Several certiﬁcateless short signature and multisignature schemes based on traditional
public key infrastructure (PKI) or identity-based cryptosystem (IBC) have been proposed in the lit-
erature; however, no certiﬁcateless short sequential (or serial) multisignature (CL-SSMS) or short
broadcast (or parallel) multisignature (CL-SBMS) schemes have been proposed. In this paper,
we propose two such new CL-SSMS and CL-SBMS schemes based on elliptic curve bilinear pairing.
Like any certiﬁcateless public key cryptosystem (CL-PKC), the proposed schemes are free from the
public key certiﬁcate management burden and the private key escrow problem as found in PKI- and
IBC-based cryptosystems, respectively. In addition, the requirements of the expected security level
and the ﬁxed length signature with constant veriﬁcation time have been achieved in our schemes.
The schemes are communication efﬁcient as the length of the multisignature is equivalent to a single
elliptic curve point and thus become the shortest possible multisignature scheme. The proposed
schemes are then suitable for communication systems having resource constrained devices such
as PDAs, mobile phones, RFID chips, and sensors where the communication bandwidth, battery
life, computing power and storage space are limited.
ª 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University.1. Introduction
Digital signatures play a vital role in the security of informa-
tion and communication networks by providing message integ-
rity, authentication and non-repudiation during transmission
over any insecure or hostile network. The property of message97369160.
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5.001integrity guarantees that the receiver detects any alteration of
the message during transmission, and the authentication prop-
erty ensures the message generation by an expected sender.
Compared with these two properties, the non-repudiation
property is equally important, which assures that after creating
a signature, the signer cannot deny the signature generation at
a later time. However, in some real-life applications, such as
electronic check signing, electronic contracts, decision-making
processes, petitions, and workﬂow systems a message needs to
be authenticated or approved by two or more persons concur-
rently. In this situation, a multisignature approach is more
appropriate than any ordinary signature scheme. There are dif-
ferent multisignature schemes (Itakura and Nakamura, 1983;
Harn, 1994; Chen and Hwang, 1994; Pon et al., 2002; Chen
et al., 2004; Meng et al., 2007; Shim, 2008; Chang et al.,ing Saud University.
90 SK Haﬁzul Islam, G.P. Biswas2009; Harn and Ren, 2010) where two or more signers mutu-
ally sign on the same message to generate a single and valid
multisignature. At a later time, the multisignature can be ver-
iﬁed by a public veriﬁer using the public keys of all the signers.
1.1. Literature review
Based on an extended RSA technique, Itakura and Nakamura
(1983) ﬁrst proposed a sequential (or serial) multisignature
scheme, and other similar schemes are presented in (Pon
et al., 2002; Meng et al., 2007; Gangishetti et al., 2006; Shim,
2008; Chu and Zhao, 2008). The CL-SSMS has many real-life
applications such as when an electronic check needs to be
signed serially by the various persons in an ofﬁce based on
their designation. On the other hand, the broadcast (or paral-
lel) multisignature schemes can be found in (Harn and Ren,
2010; Chen et al., 2004; Chang et al., 2009; Harn, 1994; Chen
and Hwang, 1994; Gangishetti et al., 2006; Chu and Zhao,
2008; Giri and Srivastava, 2007; Yang et al., 2010; Gui and
Zhang, 2010). The multisignature schemes (Giri and Srivastav-
a, 2007; Chu and Zhao, 2008; Le and Gabillon, 2009) designed
upon traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) (Difﬁe and
Hellman, 1976) have some problems such as the requirement
of huge storage space to store the public key certiﬁcates, com-
plicated management strategy to distribute the certiﬁcates and
additional computing power to verify the certiﬁcates (Giri and
Srivastava 2007; Chu and Zhao, 2008; Le and Gabillon, 2009;
Das et al., 2013). The identity-based cryptosystem (IBC), ﬁrst
introduced by Shamir (1984), can solve these drawbacks be-
cause IBC abolishes the need for public key certiﬁcate manage-
ment and distribution infrastructure (Gangishetti et al., 2006;
Biao et al. 2010; Yang et al., 2010; Islam and Biswas 2013b,
2013c) as required in PKI. A user can derive his public key
from a known identity such as an email address, and IP ad-
dress and the public key can be revoked easily by just binding
a time duration to it (Boneh and Franklin, 2001). However, be-
cause a trusted third party called the private key generator
(PKG) is required to compute the corresponding private key,
IBC becomes vulnerable to the private key escrow problem.
To remove the key escrow problem of IBC, Al-Riyami and
Paterson (2003) proposed the concept of certiﬁcateless public
key cryptography (CL-PKC), where the PKG generates the
identity-based partial private key and a user himself generates
the full private key by using the partial private key received
from PKG and his own chosen random secret value. The
PKG does not have access to the user’s full private key and
hence, the private key escrow problem and the need for a pub-
lic key certiﬁcate are solved in the CL-PKC system.1.2. Motivations and contributions
Recently, the certiﬁcateless short signature (CL-SS) schemes
(Huang et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Du and Wen, 2009;
Choi et al., 2011) have been used extensively in many re-
source constrained wireless devices such as PDAs, mobile
phones, RFID chips, and sensors where the communication
bandwidth, battery life, computing power and storage space
are limited. The short signature designed based on elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC) can also offer high levels of secu-
rity with comparatively short length signatures, and hence,
most of the schemes use ECC (Miller, 1985; Koblitz, 1987)for the implementation of public key cryptosystems (PKC).
Compared with other PKCs, the ECC-based PKC offers
the same level of security with reduced key size, faster com-
putation as well as less memory, energy and bandwidth
usage, and thus, it is more suitable for resource-constrained
devices. In the literature, several digital multisignature
schemes (Itakura and Nakamura, 1983; Harn, 1994; Chen
and Hwang, 1994; Pon et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2004; Gan-
gishetti et al., 2006; Meng et al., 2007; Giri and Srivastava,
2007; Chu and Zhao, 2008; Shim, 2008; Chang et al., 2009;
Le and Gabillon, 2009; Harn and Ren, 2010; Biao et al.,
2010; Yang et al., 2010; Gui and Zhang, 2010) in PKI or
IBC and many certiﬁcateless short signature schemes have
been proposed; however, no certiﬁcateless short multisigna-
ture scheme has yet been designed. We combined the advan-
tages of short signature and multisignature together with the
features of CL-PKC and propose two efﬁcient certiﬁcateless
short sequential multisignature (CL-SSMS) and certiﬁcateless
short broadcast multisignature (CL-SBMS) schemes using
elliptic curve bilinear pairing (Boneh and Franklin, 2001). It
is shown that both the schemes are secure and more compu-
tationally efﬁcient than the others. The length of the pro-
posed multisignature in both of the schemes is equal to an
elliptic curve point and thus efﬁcient in communication.
1.3. Paper organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes some preliminary ideas about elliptic curve bilinear
pairing and the related intractable hard problems. In Section 3,
the two proposed certiﬁcateless short multisignature schemes
CL-SSMS and CL-SBMS are described. The security and efﬁ-
ciency analyses of the schemes are given in Section 4, and Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper.
2. Preliminaries
This section brieﬂy describes the basic concepts and properties
of bilinear pairing and some computational hard problems,
which are incorporated in our proposed signature schemes
for achieving the desired security.
2.1. Bilinear pairing
Let Gq be an additive cyclic group of elliptic curve points of
prime order q (where qP 2k and k is security parameter)
and Gm be a multiplicative group of the same order q. Let
e^ : Gq  Gq ! Gm be an admissible bilinear mapping that satis-
ﬁes the following properties:
 Bilinearity: For any P, Q, R e Gq then e^ðP þ Q;RÞ ¼
e^ðP ;RÞe^ðQ;RÞ and e^ðP ;Qþ RÞ ¼ e^ðP ;QÞe^ðP ;RÞ. Therefore,
for any a; b2RZq : hateðaP ; bQÞ ¼ e^ðP ;QÞab ¼ e^ðabP ;QÞ ¼
e^ðP ; abQÞ holds.
 Non-degeneracy: There exists P, Q e Gq such that eˆ(P,
Q) „ 1m, where 1m is an identity element of Gm.
 Computability: There must be an efﬁcient algorithm, which
can compute eˆ(P, Q) for all P, Q e Gq.
In general, Gq is a group of points on an elliptic curve and
Gm is a multiplicative subgroup of a ﬁnite ﬁeld. The bilinear
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from the Tate pairing over a ﬁnite ﬁeld. A more comprehensive
description about bilinear pairings, selection of elliptic curves
and suitable parameters and group formation can be found
in (Boneh and Franklin, 2001; Boneh et al., 2004).
2.2. Computational problems
Some computational problems in the elliptic curve group and
bilinear pairing, which are assumed to be secure and cannot be
breached using a polynomial time-bounded algorithm (Ko-
blitz, 1989; Silverman and Suzuki, 1998; Menezes et al.,
1993; Frey et al., 1999; Gaudry, 2000), are described below.
 Elliptic curve discrete logarithm eˆ problem (ECDLP). Given
a random instance of P,Q e Gq, ﬁnd an integer a2RZq such
that Q= aP.
 Computational Difﬁe-Hellman problem (CDHP): Given a
random instance of (P,aP,bP) for any a; b2RZq; the compu-
tation of abP is hard to the group Gq.
 Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman problem (BDHP): Given a random
instance of (P,aP,bP,cP) and for any a; b; c2RZq; it is impos-
sible to compute eˆ(P, Q)abc.
3. Proposed CL-SSMS and CL-SBMS schemes
In this section, two efﬁcient short multisignature schemes,
called certiﬁcateless short sequential or serial multisignature
(CL-SSMS) and certiﬁcateless short broadcast or parallel mul-
tisignature (CL-SBMS) based on ECC and bilinear pairing are
proposed. Let A= {A1,A2,  An} be a set of n signers and their
respective identities ID= {ID1,ID2,  IDn}. Now each signer
Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ generates full private key ski = (Di, xi) and public
key pki = (Qi, Pi) using the proposed scheme as described
below.Figure 1 The proposed CL-SSMS scheme.3.1. Proposed CL-SSMS scheme
The signing order in our scheme is determined by either the
message issuer or the signers themselves; however, the order
is random. At the beginning, the message issuer issues and
sends a message m (say) to A1 as the ﬁrst signer. Then A1 com-
putes the signature r1 on m and sends m, r1 to the next signer
A2. Upon receiving (m, r1), A2 veriﬁes (m, r1) and computes
the signature (m, r2), and sends the same to the third signer
A3 for further signing. This process continues until the last
signer signs the message m. Thus, we can say that the signer
Ai veriﬁes (m, ri-1) received from the signer Ai1 and then pro-
duces the signature (m, ri) using his full private key. Finally,
the last signer An generates the full multisignature with respect
to all signers, which is allowed to be veriﬁed by any public
veriﬁer using the public keys of all the signers. The proposed
CL-SSMS scheme consists of seven phases, the details of which
are described below in the accompanying ﬂow diagram as
illustrated in Fig. 1.
 Setup: The PKG runs this algorithm to generate the sys-
tem’s parameter. For a given security parameter k e Z+,
PKG does the following:(a) Choose an additive cyclic elliptic curve group (Gq, +)
of prime order q, a multiplicative group (Gm, ) of
order q and an admissible bilinear map
e^ : Gq  Gq ! Gm:
(b) Choose a number s2RZq; a generator point P of Gq
and compute P0 = sP, where the private–public key
pair of PKG is (s, P0).
(c) Choose two one-way and secure cryptographic hash
functions H1:{0,1}
* · Gqﬁ Gq and H2:{0, 1}*ﬁ Gq.
(d) Publish X ¼ fGq;Gm; e^; q; P ; P 0;H 1;H 2g as the sys-
tem’s parameter while the master key msk= s is k-
ept secret by the PKG.
 Set-Secret-Value: The user IDi picks a number xi2RZq as his
secret value and then computes the corresponding public
key as Pi = xiP
 Partial-private-key-extract: This algorithm is executed by
the PKG to generate users’ identity-based partial private
keys. It takes X, master key msk= s, user identity IDi
and partial public key Pi of IDi as inputs and generates
the partial private key Di for IDi as follows:
(a) Compute Qi = H1(IDi, Pi).
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IDi via a secure channel.
 Set-private-key: The user IDi sets ski = (Di, xi) as his full
private key.
 Set-public-key: The user IDi sets pki = (Qi, Pi) as his full
public key.
 CL-SSMS-sign: In order to generate a sequential short mul-
tisignature for a given message m e {0, 1}*, each signer
Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ performs the following operations:
Step 1: The signer A1
(a) Computes r1 = x1H2(m) + D1.
(b) Sends the message-signature pair (m, r1) to the next
signer A2.
Step 2: The signerA2
(a) Veriﬁes (m, r1) by determining whether the equation
e^ðr1; P Þ ¼ e^ðH 2ðmÞ; P 1Þe^ðQ1; P 0Þ holds.
(b) If it holds, A2 computes r2 = r1 + x2H2(m) + D2 i.e.,
r2 = x1H2(m) + x2H2(m) + D1 + D2 and then sends
(m, r2) to the signer A3
Similarly, the signer A3 signs and sends to A4 and so on up
to An2 to An1. All sequentially compute their signatures and
complete the multisignature process.
Step n: The last signer An
(a) Veriﬁes (m, rn1) received from An1 by determining
whether the equation e^ðrn1; P Þ ¼ e^ðH 2ðmÞ;
Pn1
¼1 P iÞ
e^ðPn1i¼1Qi; P 0Þ holds.
(b) If it holds, An computes rn= rn1 + xnH2(m) + Dn
i.e., rn ¼
Pn
i¼1½xiH 2ðmÞ þ Di ¼ r (say) and then sends
the ﬁnal signature (m, r) to the veriﬁer for veriﬁcation.
 CL-SSMS-verify: In order to verify (m, r), the following
steps are to be executed by the veriﬁer:
(a) Compute PT ¼
Pn
i¼1P i and Q ¼
Pn
i¼1Qi:Figure 2 The proposed(b) Verify whether the equation e^ðr; P Þ ¼ e^ðH 2ðmÞ;
PT Þ e^ðQ; P 0Þ holds. If so, the veriﬁer accepts (m, r);
otherwise the veriﬁer rejects it.
 Correctness of the proposed CL-SSMS scheme
The received message-signature pair (m, r) is accepted by
the veriﬁer since the following holds:
e^ðr;PÞ¼ e^
Xn
i¼1
ri;P
 !
¼ e^
Xn
i¼1
ðxiH2ðmÞþDiÞ;P
 !
¼ e^
Xn
i¼1
xiH2ðmÞ;PÞ e^ð
Xn
i¼1
Di;P
 !
½duetobilinearity
¼ e^ðH2ðmÞ;PÞ
Xn
i¼1
xi
 e^ð
Xn
i¼1
Di;PÞ½duetobilinearity
¼ e^ðH2ðmÞ;
Xn
i¼1
xiPÞ e^ð
Xn
i¼1
sQi;PÞ½*Di¼sQi
¼ e^ðH2ðmÞ;
Xn
i¼1
PiÞ e^ð
Xn
i¼1
Qi;sPÞ½*Pi¼xiP
¼ e^ðH2ðmÞ;PTÞ e^ðQ;P0Þ½*PT¼
Xn
i¼1
Pi;Q¼
Xn
i¼1
Qi;P0¼sP
This assures the correctness of the proposed CL-SSMS
scheme.
3.2. Proposed CL-SBMS scheme
In the broadcast multisignature scheme, the message issuer
broadcasts the message m to the group members A= {A1,CL-SBMS scheme.
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generates his own signature ri on the same message m simulta-
neously and then sends it to the designated clerk An (say). Now
An veriﬁes the individual signatures rið1 6 i 6 nÞ and gener-
ates the ﬁnal short multisignature r on behalf of the group.
The proposed complete CL-SBMS scheme consists of the
following seven algorithms: Setup, Set-Secret-Value, Partial-
Private-Key-Extract, Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key, CL-
SBMS-Sign and CL-SBMS-Verify, where all these algorithms
except CL-SBMS-Sign and CL-SBMS-Verify are the same
and already discussed in the proposed CL-SSMS scheme.
Thus, only CL-SBMS-Sign and CL-SBMS-Verify algorithms
are discussed now. As an illustration, the proposed CL-SBMS
is further described by the block diagram in Fig. 2.
 CL-SBMS-sign: For a given message m e {0, 1}*, each
signer Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ performs the following:
 Computes ri = xiH2(m) + Di
 Sends the message-signature pair(m, ri) to the designated
clerk An
 The clerk An veriﬁes the message-signature pair (m, ri) by
determining whether the equation e^ðri; P Þ ¼ e^ðH 2ðmÞ; P iÞ
e^ðQi; P 0Þ holds.
 If each of the pair ðm; riÞð1 6 i 6 nÞ is valid, An then com-
putes the multisignature r ¼Pni¼1ri and sends the ﬁnal
message-signature pair (m, r) to the veriﬁer for veriﬁcation.
 CL-SBMS-verify: In order to verify (m, r), the veriﬁer carry
out the following steps:
(a) Compute PT ¼
Pn
i¼1P i and Q ¼
Pn
i¼1Qi:
(b) Verify whether the equation e^ðr; PÞ ¼ e^ðH 2ðmÞ; PT Þ
e^ðQ; P 0Þ holds. If so, the veriﬁer accepts (m, r); other-
wise the veriﬁer rejects it.
 Correctness of the proposed CL-SBMS scheme
(a) For the correctness of the proposed scheme, let us
ﬁrst check the individual message-signature pairs
ðm; riÞð1 6 i 6 nÞ: Since P0 = sP and Pi = xiP,
Di = sQi, ri = xiH2(m) + Di For ð1 6 i 6 nÞ; we
havee^ðri;PÞ ¼ e^ðxiH2ðmÞ þDi;PÞ
¼ e^ðxiH2ðmÞ;PÞe^ðDi;PÞ½due to bilinearity
¼ e^ðH2ðmÞ;PÞxi e^ðDi;PÞ½dueto bilinearity
¼ e^ðH2ðmÞ; xiPÞe^ðsQi;PÞ½*Pi ¼ xiP; Di ¼ sQi
¼ e^ðH2ðmÞ;PiÞe^ðQi; sPÞ½due to bilinearity
¼ e^ðH2ðmÞ;PiÞe^ðQi;P0Þ½*P0 ¼ sP
Thus, the message-signature pairs ðm; riÞð1 6 i 6 nÞ is valid.
(a) The checking of the correctness of the ﬁnal multisigna-
ture (m, r) as the last step is also valid as already proven
in the earlier section.4. Analysis of the proposed CL-SSMS and CL-SBMS schemes
The security and efﬁciency analyses of the proposed CL-SSMS
and CL-SBMS schemes are discussed in this section. First, we
analyze different security aspects of the two proposed short
multisignature schemes. Then their efﬁciencies in terms of
computation as well as communication costs are estimated.4.1. Security analysis
It is known that the unforgeability against different types of
adversaries is one of the most important security properties
of any digital signature scheme, where unforgeability means
only the group members are able to compute the valid multi-
signature on behalf of the group and no outsider(s) or a collud-
ing subset of the group members can generate any of the
proposed multisignature schemes. Based on the CL-PKC sys-
tem (Al-Riyami and Paterson, 2003; Huang et al., 2006,
2007; Chen et al., 2008; Du and Wen, 2009; Choi et al.,
2011), the unforgeability of any signature scheme involves
two types of adversaries called Type I and Type II. The Type
I adversary AI represents an outsider attacker who is able to
replace the public key of any user with a value of his own
choice, but he is unable to access the PKG’s master private
key. This attack caused by the adversaryAI is known as public
key replacement attack (Gorantla and Saxena, 2005; Huang
et al., 2006; Gangishetti et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2007; Chu
and Zhao, 2008; Le and Gabillon, 2009; Biao et al., 2010; Is-
lam and Biswas, 2012b; Islam and Biswas, 2013a). On the
other hand, the Type II adversary AII acts as a malicious
PKG (insider attacker) who is not allowed to replace users’
public keys, but can access the PKG’s master private key. This
type of attack is called malicious PKG attack (Gorantla and
Saxena, 2005; Huang et al., 2006; Gangishetti et al., 2006;
Huang et al., 2007; Chu and Zhao, 2008; Le and Gabillon,
2009; Biao et al., 2010; Islam and Biswas, 2012b; Islam and
Biswas, 2013a). Now, the security analysis of the proposed
short multisignature schemes against different adversaries is
given.
4.1.1. Unforgeability against the adversary AI (public key
replacement attack resilience)
The adversary AI can replace the public key Pi of the user
Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ with a value P0i of his choice; however, he cannot
access the master private key msk= s of the PKG (Al-Riyami
and Paterson, 2003; Huang et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2007;
Chen et al., 2008; Du and Wen, 2009; Choi et al., 2011; Islam
and Biswas, 2012b; Islam and Biswas, 2013a). Although AI
knows the secret value x0i corresponding to the replaced public
key P0ið1 6 i 6 nÞ, AI cannot forge any of the CL-SSMS and
CL-SBMS schemes without the knowledge of the partial pri-
vate key Di of the user Ai. Note that the partial private
Di ¼ sQið1 6 i 6 nÞ must be used to generate the individual
signature ri = xiH2(m) + Di, and it can be computed only if
PKG’s master private key msk= s is known. However,
although s can be extracted from P0 = sP, the ECDLP is
not solvable by any polynomial time-bounded algorithm (Ko-
blitz, 1989; Silverman and Suzuki, 1998; Menezes et al., 1993;
Frey et al., 1999; Gaudry, 2000), because it is known that such
an algorithm does not exist. Thus,AI cannot generate ri = x-
iH2(m) + Di and the ﬁnal signature r as well. Hence, the pro-
posed CL-SSMS and CL-SBMS schemes are secure against the
adversary AI.
4.1.2. Unforgeability against the adversaryAII (Malicious PKG
attack resilience)
The adversary AII can access PKG’s master private key
msk = s but, the public key Pi of the user Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ is
not allowed to be replaced by a value chosen by him
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et al., 2008; Du and Wen, 2009; Choi et al., 2011; Islam and
Biswas, 2012b; Islam and Biswas, 2013a). Since the master pri-
vate key msk = s is known to AII, he also knows the partial
private key Dið1 6 i 6 nÞ of the user Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ: However,
the generation of the individual signature ri = xiH2(m) + Di
for ð1 6 i 6 nÞ is only possible if the secret value
xið1 6 i 6 nÞ is known to AII. Although he may try to derive
xi from Pi ¼ xiPð1 6 i 6 nÞ; he needs to solve the EDCLP in
the elliptic curve group, which is not solvable in polynomial
time. Thus, we can conclude that the forgery of the proposed
CL-SSMS and CL-SBMS schemes is impossible by the adver-
sary AII.
4.1.3. Unforgeability against normal adversary
Assume that an adversary AIII has knowledge about system’s
parameter X ¼ fGq;Gm; e^; q;P;P0;H1;H2g only and he tries to
impersonate a user Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ:. The adversary AIII can
impersonate a user Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ i.e., he can generate a forged
multisignature on behalf of Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ; if PKG’s master pri-
vate key msk= s is known. If s is disclosed toAIII, then he can
impersonate Ai just by selecting a number xi2RZq as his secret
value since no public key certiﬁcate corresponding to the pub-
lic key Pi = xiP is used in CL-PKC. Therefore, the adversary
AIII can try to compute msk= s from PKG’s public key
P0 = sP. However, due to the difﬁculties of solving the
ECDLP in the elliptic curve group, the master private key s
cannot be extracted from P0. So we can conclude that both
the proposed multisignature schemes are secure against the
adversary AIII under the ECDLP problem.
4.1.4. Achieving Girault’s trust level
In 1992, (Girault, 1992) deﬁnes different types of trust levels as
given below, which must be achieved in designing an efﬁcient
digital signature scheme:
 Level 1: The PKG does not know the private keys but, it
can still impersonate any user by generating false public
keys that may be used without being detected.
 Level 2: The PKG can impersonate any user without being
detected since PKG knows the users’ private keys.
 Level 3: The PKG cannot compute the private keys and if it
generates false certiﬁcates for users, it can be detected.
For Trust Level 1, an adversary is allowed to replace the
public key Pið1 6 i 6 nÞ of Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ by a false public
keyP0ið1 6 i 6 nÞ of his choice and thus, he knows the secret
value x0ið1 6 i 6 nÞ corresponding to P0ið1 6 i 6 nÞ: However,
the master secret msk= s is unknown to him. This trust level
is equivalent to the adversary AI, and since it is discussedTable 1 Notations and descriptions of various cryptographic opera
Notations Descriptions
TEM Time complexity for exe
TBP Time complexity for exe
TPX Time complexity for exe
TEX Time complexity for exe
TEA Time complexity for exeelaborately in Section 4.1.1, we can say that our schemes
achieve Trust Level 1. Again from the deﬁnition of Trust Level
2, an adversary cannot replace the public keys Pið1 6 i 6 nÞ;
but can compute the secret key Di ¼ sQið1 6 i 6 nÞ of
Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ since he can access the master secret msk= s
of PKG. Hence, the Trust Level 2 is actually AII and our
scheme can achieve this trust level also as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1.2. According to the deﬁnition of Trust Level 3 (Gira-
ult, 1992; Gorantla and Saxena, 2005), an untrusted PKG,
who can replace the public keys Pi ¼ xiP1 6 i 6 nÞ with false
public keys Pi00 ¼ xi00P1 6 i 6 nÞ of his choice, does not have
the knowledge about the secret key xið1 6 i 6 nÞ; but can still
impersonate a user Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ without being detected, since
the partial private keys Di ¼ sQið1 6 i 6 nÞ are known to
PKG. Thus, the untrusted PKG can compute a forged multi-
signature by generating another valid key pair ðDi;P00i Þ for
ð1 6 i 6 nÞ corresponding to the user Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ. Here we
have shown that the proposed signature schemes also achieve
Girault’s Trust Level 3. In our schemes, user Ai generates his
secret value xi and the corresponding public key Pi = xiP,
and generates the partial private keys as Di = sQi, where
Qi = H1(IDi, Pi). Therefore, user Ai owns only one partial pri-
vate key Di corresponding to the public key Pi = xiP and he
cannot generate another false public key P00i ¼ x00i P by main-
taining the same partial private key Di. However, PKG can
compute another pair ðDi;P00i Þð1 6 i 6 nÞ on behalf of
Aið1 6 i 6 nÞ and it can be detected easily because only he
has that ability.
4.2. Performance analysis
This section analyzes the performance of the proposed CL-
SSMS and CL-SBMS schemes, where the computation cost
and communication cost (signature length) are considered.
For this, we use the method adopted in (Barreto et al., 2004;
Chung et al., 2007; Ren et al., 2007; Tan et al., 2010; Cao
et al., 2010; He et al., 2011; Islam and Biswas, 2012a), where
the bilinear pairing (Tate pairing) is deﬁned over the super-
singular elliptic curve E/Fp: y
2 = x3 + x with embedding de-
gree 2 to achieve 1024-bit RSA level security, and the Solinas
prime q = 2159 + 217 + 1 is a 160-bit number (Solinas, 2011)
and p is a 512-bit prime satisfying p+ 1= 12qr. In addition,
we consider the running time calculated for different crypto-
graphic operations in (Ren et al., 2007; Cao et al., 2010; He
et al., 2011) using MIRACAL software (Shamus Software
Ltd, 1988) and implemented on a Pentium IV 3 GHZ processor
with 512 MB RAM and the Windows XP (Microsoft) operat-
ing system. Furthermore, Chung et al. (2007) indicate that
the time needed to execute the modular exponentiation (TEX)
is approximately 240TML, where TML represents the time com-
plexity of executing the modular multiplication. It was alsotions and their operational time (in milliseconds).
cuting the elliptic curve scalar point multiplication, 1TEM  6.38 ms
cuting the bilinear pairing operation, 1TBP  20.01 ms
cuting pairing-based exponentiation, 1TPX  11.20 ms
cuting the modular exponentiation, 1TEX  55.20 ms
cuting the addition of two elliptic curve points, which is negligible
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Certiﬁcateless short sequential and broadcast multisignature schemes using elliptic curve bilinear pairings 95mentioned in (Cao et al., 2010; He et al., 2011) that the time
needed to execute one bilinear pairing (Tate pairing) operation
(TBP) is approximately 20.01 ms i.e., 1TBP  20.01 ms, and
from the works proposed in (Barreto et al., 2004; Tan et al.,
2010), we obtained 1TBP  3TEM  87TML, where TEM indi-
cates the time complexity for executing one elliptic curve scalar
point multiplication. Thus, the execution of one modular expo-
nentiation (TEX) operation on a Pentium IV 3 GHZ processor
with 512 MB RAM and Windows XP takes about
(20.01 · 240)/87  55.2 ms i.e., 1TEX  55.2 ms. The deﬁnition,
description and the running time (in milliseconds) of various
cryptographic operations are presented in Table 1.
Now, we compare the two proposed multisignature
schemes with the multisignature schemes available in the liter-
ature (Gangishetti et al., 2006; Giri and Srivastava, 2007; Chu
and Zhao 2008; Le and Gabillon, 2009; Biao et al., 2010; Yang
et al., 2010; Gui and Zhang, 2010). Table 2 summarizes the
same in terms of the notations given in Table 1, whereas the
corresponding numerical values (running time) in terms of n
(number of signers) are given in Table 3. It can be seen that
two existing multisignature schemes (Gangishetti et al., 2006;
Chu and Zhao, 2008) require comparatively lower computa-
tion costs and are (76.72n  6.38) ms and (55.2n + 110.4)
ms, respectively, whereas our proposed methods have reported
the lowest computation costs of 46.4n ms for both of the mul-
tisignature schemes. Similarly, the communication cost of our
proposed schemes as shown in Table 2 has the lowest cost by
using single elliptic curve point.
Furthermore, a multisignature scheme is called computa-
tion and communication efﬁcient if the following two require-
ments are achieved:
 Fixed length signature: A multisignature scheme is called
ﬁxed length if the length of the ﬁnal multisignature is the
same as the length of the individual signature generated
by each signer. In our schemes (CL-SSMS and CL-SBMS),
the lengths of the both individual signature ri for
ð1 6 i 6 nÞ and the ﬁnal multisignature r are equal to an
elliptic curve point (1P). So the proposed CL-SSMS and
CL-SBMS are the ﬁxed length multisignature schemes.
 Constant veriﬁcation time: A multisignature has constant
veriﬁcation time if the time needed to verify either the ﬁnal
multisignature or an individual signature is the same. In
case of the proposed CL-SSMS scheme, the veriﬁcation
equation e^ðrn1; P Þ ¼ e^ðH 2ðmÞ;
Pn1
i¼1 P iÞe^ð
Pn1
i¼1Qi P 0Þ shows
that only two bilinear pairing operations are executed to
verify an individual signature ri, and where the other com-
putations such as
Pn1
i¼1 P i;
Pn1
i¼1Qi and e^ð
Pn1
i¼1Qi; P 0Þ can be
computed ofﬂine since P0, Pi and Qið1 6 i 6 nÞ are known
publicly. Thus, the time needed to verify an individual sig-
nature of a signer is 2TBP  40.02 ms. On the other hand,
the ﬁnal multisignature (m, r) can be veriﬁed by using the
equation e^ðr; P Þ ¼ e^ðH 2ðmÞ; PT Þe^ðQ; P 0Þ and accordingly
the veriﬁcation time is also 2TBP  40.02 ms. Hence, the
proposed CL-SSMS scheme achieves the constant veriﬁca-
tion time attribute. Similarly, the other proposed CL-SBMS
scheme also satisﬁes a constant veriﬁcation time.
In Table 4, we compare our schemes in terms of cryptosys-
tems used by various existing schemes (Gangishetti et al., 2006;
Giri and Srivastava, 2007; Chu and Zhao 2008; Le and Gabil-
lon, 2009; Biao et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2010; Gui and Zhang,
Table 4 Comparison of the proposed CL-SSMS and CL-
SBMS schemes with others in terms of the cryptosystem used.
Schemes Cryptosystem used
Gangishetti et al (2006) IBC
Gangishetti et al (2006) IBC
Giri and Srivastava (2007) PKI
Chu and Zhao (2008) PKI
Chu and Zhao (2008) PKI
Le and Gabillon (2009) PKI
Biao et al. (2010) IBC
Yang et al. (2010) IBC
Gui and Zhang (2010) IBC
Proposed CL-SSMS CL-PKC
Proposed CL-SBMS CL-PKC
Table 3 Cost comparison of the proposed CL-SSMS and CL-SBMS schemes with others in terms of running time (in milliseconds).
Schemes Computation costs
Signature generation cost
(in milliseconds)
Signature veriﬁcation cost
(in milliseconds)
Total cost
(in milliseconds)
Gangishetti et al (2006) 70.34n46.40 6.38n + 40.02 76.72n6.38
Gangishetti et al (2006) 90.37n 51.22 90.37n + 51.22
Giri and Srivastava (2007) 220.80n 110.40 220.80n + 110.40
Chu and Zhao (2008) 110.40n 110.40 110.40n + 110.40
Chu and Zhao (2008) 55.20n 110.40 55.20n + 110.40
Le and Gabillon (2009) 96.02n 62.42 96.02n + 62.42
Biao et al. (2010) 161.60n 71.23 161.60n + 71.23
Yang et al. (2010) 110.40n 110.40 110.40n + 110.40
Gui and Zhang (2010) 70.36n + 11.2 11.2n + 71.23 81.56n + 82.43
Proposed CL-SSMS 46.40n40.02 40.02 46.40n
Proposed CL-SBMS 46.40n40.02 40.02 46.40n
96 SK Haﬁzul Islam, G.P. Biswas2010). The schemes of (Giri and Srivastava, 2007; Chu and
Zhao, 2008; Le and Gabillon, 2009) are designed based upon
PKI and thus suffer from the overhead of public key certiﬁcate
storage and management, whereas the schemes (Gangishetti
et al., 2006; Biao et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2010; Gui and
Zhang, 2010) have private key escrow problem as they are
developed based upon IBC. Since our CL-SSMS and CL-
SBMS schemes are designed based upon CL-PKC, which is
superior to both PKI and IBC cryptosystems, the proposed
multisignature methods are also more efﬁcient than (Gangish-
etti et al., 2006; Giri and Srivastava, 2007; Chu and Zhao 2008;
Le and Gabillon, 2009; Biao et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2010; Gui
and Zhang, 2010).
5. Conclusions
In this paper, two certiﬁcateless short multisignature schemes
CL-SSMS and CL-SBMS using elliptic curve and bilinear pair-
ing are proposed, where the former scheme is suitable for
sequential architectures and the latter one is suitable for paral-
lel architectures. The proposed schemes have been developed
using the most efﬁcient CL-PKC cryptosystems, which are free
from the public key certiﬁcate management burden and the
private key escrow problem. The security analysis has been
provided and shown that the proposed schemes are secure
against both Type I and Type II adversaries existent in any
CL-PKC cryptosystem. Moreover, both the schemes produceshort signatures of length equal to a single elliptic curve point
and require constant veriﬁcation time. Thus they are applica-
ble in resource-constrained environments where communica-
tion bandwidth, battery life, computing power, and storage
space are limited. However, the proposed CL-SSMS and CL-
SBMS schemes suffer from the execution of costly elliptic
curve bilinear pairing and Map-To-Point hash functions. In
addition, a super-singular elliptic curve group with a large
group-size is required for realization of bilinear pairing, and
Map-To-Point hash function implementation is a probabilistic
approach. Therefore, the short multisignature scheme without
bilinear pairing and Map-To-Point hash function would be at-
tempted for further improvement and suitable for real-life
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